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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Rising population, economic development and resource depletion, including climate 
change, threaten access by the poor to water for direct consumption and for productive 
use. Drawing on examples from across the African continent, this paper examines the 
effects of development interventions that have separated and conflated the land and water 
rights of poor producers. Negative outcomes have resulted from the failure of 
governments and donors to appreciate the vulnerability of poor people to the loss of their 
water entitlements, arising from sheer neglect, the dysfunctional design of development 
interventions and the privatisation of group-based property rights by the powerful. 
 
The African land mass is about 30 million square kilometres, of which 7 million (23 
percent) are arid, 13 million (43 percent) are semi-arid, and 10 million (34 percent) are 
sub humid or humid. The main focus of this paper is on land-water interactions in the two 
thirds of Africa comprising the arid and semi-arid areas, where, for much of the year and 
in the absence of adequate rainfall, crop and livestock production are possible only with 
the aid of lifting and hydraulic structures (wells, pumps, reservoirs, dams, diversion weirs 
etc.) or with the carefully managed use of available natural water sources (streams, rivers, 
ponds, pans etc.). Two broad production systems are thus considered: irrigated agriculture 
for crop and livestock production, and pastoralist systems (extensive livestock 
production).  
 
In terms of quantity, irrigated production systems are by far the biggest consumers of 
water. In rural areas of semi-arid Africa, for example, a good water supply for domestic 
and livestock use will be a very inadequate supply for irrigation; if all the water consumed 
in a month by a rural community of 1000 people with 250 cattle and 500 sheep and goats 
were used for irrigation, it would be adequate for only two irrigations a month to about a 
quarter of a hectare of annual crops (e.g. maize, cotton, groundnuts).  
  
People can be ‘water poor’- in the sense of not having sufficient water for their needs - 
because the physical infrastructure is ill developed, or because water is unavailable or 
limited in quantity for other reasons, and/or because of loss of entitlements as a result of 
policies outside their control. Water poverty can also be related to loss of water 
entitlements in the different production systems (irrigated agriculture and pastoralism) 
that are linked to broader sets of property rights regulating people’s access to land and 
water. In very general terms these can be characterised as weak group-based rights to land 
and water for pastoralists, based almost exclusively on unwritten traditional or customary 
law (Niamir-Fuller 1990), and relatively stronger individually-based rights for irrigators, 
which are also sometimes informal in nature but are more commonly rooted in statutory 
law. Changes to land and water rights over time may contribute to water poverty, as a 
result of, for example, the differing origins and evolution of customary and statutory law, 
and of changes in government policies and conditions of access (as influenced by broader 
socio-economic, political and environmental change). In turn, these factors affect both the 
equity of access to and control of land and water and the sustainability of their use.  
  
 
The planning and execution of land and water policies, and the laws governing land and 
water allocation and use, are almost universally poorly administered across Africa. Public 
institutions are typically over-centralised, inaccessible, rent-seeking, corrupt and arbitrary 
(Okoth-Ogendo 2000). Arrangements for the resolution of disputes over land and water 
rights and for hearing appeals against administrative decisions are inadequate. Land and 
water management functions are poorly funded, executed and largely ignored. Equitable 
resource allocation in both sectors has therefore proved very difficult, each in its own 
way. The challenge now is to harmonize land and water allocation and use in order to 
obtain integrated management of these resources and secure the livelihoods of the poor. 
Many African countries have adopted formal land and water policies influenced by the 
emerging international consensus. But there have so far been few examples of successful 
implementation. What now are the most promising entry points, and what worthwhile 
initiatives can be identified?  
 
In seeking policy options to meet these challenges, the paper reviews the nature of the 
resources concerned, the principles and evolution of land and water rights in irrigated and 
pastoral systems (covering both customary and statutory rights), the administration and 
management of land and water rights and, finally, suggests policies which might 
contribute to more equitable, productive and sustainable water use, and to future water 
developments that offer opportunities rather than threats to the poor. The issues relating to 
land-water interactions are illustrated throughout with examples drawn from across the 
region. These examples are to be found in the appendices to this report. 
 
2.  RESOURCE CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSTRAINTS 
2.1.  Irrigation Resources 
Irrigated agriculture is ill-developed over most of Africa and average water withdrawals 
per head of population are well below those in other continents. Formal irrigation is 
concentrated in the lower Nile Valley (Egypt and Sudan), other arid and semi-arid areas 
of Northern Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia), and in South Africa and 
Madagascar. Together, these eight countries account for about 85 percent of the presently 
irrigated land, with the balance (15 percent) distributed sporadically across the other 45 
countries on the continent (FAO 2006). At the risk of over-generalisation, we outline the 
major characteristics and constraints of the three most important irrigation contexts in 
turn, respectively those of: (i) the lower Nile Valley, (ii) the arid and semi-arid regions 
where formal irrigation is firmly established, and (iii) the (predominantly) semi-arid 
regions where irrigation has still to be successful. 
 
Egypt (27.5 percent) and Sudan (14 percent) together account for more than 40 percent of 
the total area under irrigation in Africa. Irrigation in the lower Nile Valley is of ancient 
provenance, with cultivation dependent on the annual Nile flood. In Egypt, rights to use 
water are intrinsic to the conditions of land tenure (given the very limited productive 
value of arid land without water), and in the old lands ancient customary water rights have 
been incorporated into what are essentially all now private rights to land (Appendix 1). In 
Sudan, during the colonial era large-scale irrigation was established on land which had 
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limited alternative agro-pastoral use, and new forms of land ownership and rights evolved 
(Appendix 2). Although this was not without consequences for groups such as pastoralists 
and women (Appendix 3), the financial returns were large and unambiguous, management 
was effective and, with intensive irrigation secured by storage dams or the use of pumps, 
and relatively abundant water resources and fertile soils, these investments in capital 
works have generally proved durable. As in the traditional riverine areas of Egypt, rights 
to water in Sudan are now closely linked to those to land.  
 
A somewhat comparable situation has evolved in other arid and semi-arid regions of both 
northern and southern Africa where formal irrigation has taken root. Well-managed 
irrigation supporting intensive crop production gives such high returns relative to any 
alternative agricultural use of land that it has frequently overwhelmed local customary 
rights, with rights of access to water having become largely determined by either land 
ownership or occupation of land within irrigation schemes. However, in contrast to the 
Nile Valley, water resources are often limited relative to the land area commanded. In 
water-scarce, closed river basins, available resources may be almost fully developed 
through a combination of public and private initiatives.
1 Expanding populations, 
economic growth and the needs of the environment are putting pressure on the water 
available to agriculture. Declining water tables, pre-emption of supplies by rich 
commercial farmers and water shortages experienced by land holders at the end of water 
distribution channels (‘tail-end problems’) undermine the water security of weaker and 
more vulnerable farmers in ways that neither government regulation nor community 
action have so far been able to adequately address. At critical times of the year, farmers 
within irrigation schemes cannot always be certain that they will receive the supply they 
expect on the basis of prior or established use, as their rights are eroded by a combination 
of declining supplies and changes in power relations within the scheme management.  
 
It is in the vast semi-arid regions of Africa where formal irrigation has still to be 
successful that the most complex difficulties and conflicts around land and water arise. It 
is commonly said that there is large potential for irrigation in these areas, given 
unexploited water in the rivers. But irrigation can be very costly and water variability and 
seasonal scarcity often provide an inadequate basis for profitable investment. Moreover, 
rainfall during the wet season already supports long-established communities based on 
alternative patterns of land use, exploiting rivers and wetlands in numerous different 
ways, including local techniques of furrow and falling-flood irrigation. These 
communities have evolved coping strategies for surviving through the dry season that are 
reflected in customary and informal arrangements that are difficult if not impossible to 
incorporate in formal irrigation design (Appendices 4 and 5). Such arrangements are 
themselves typically dynamic, as individuals and communities respond continuously to 
the incentives and opportunities that they encounter; this dynamism is not without 
tensions, but the imposition of modern forms of irrigation can be particularly 
counterproductive. If the economic justification for investment is unambiguous, some 
sacrifice of traditional arrangements and values may be a necessary consequence. But if, 
                                                 
1 A closed basin is one where the water is fully committed: little or no water reaches the sea other than 
discharges for environmental purposes and further irrigation development is conditional on reallocation of 
irrigation supply. 
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as is often the case, the economic justification for major new irrigation development is 
itself questionable, then there will be no grounds for undermining customary systems that 
have proven adaptable to the needs and capacities of the existing populations – both 
settled and nomadic.  
 
2.2.  Pastoral Resources  
In contrast to irrigated agriculture, pastoralist systems are more entrenched and 
widespread; their adaptability to highly variable environmental conditions makes 
extensive livestock production one of the most appropriate types of land use in the arid 
and semi-arid regions of Africa.
2 In the Sahel, the Horn and East Africa, herds of camels 
and cattle and flocks of sheep and goats (very often mixed herds and flocks) are close 
herded by nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists and (on smaller orbits) by agro-
pastoralists from one location to another as they track the seasonal availability of water, 
grazing and browse. In nomadic pastoralism herds and families are extremely mobile and 
crop cultivation plays, at most, a minor role; in semi-nomadic pastoralism mobility is on a 
smaller scale (involving not all people) and livestock husbandry retains social primacy 
although crop cultivation may be of equal importance to livelihoods; in agro-pastoralism 
crop cultivation usually takes precedence in terms of both income generation and the 
allocation of household labour and, although livestock remain socially important, herd 
mobility may be quite limited – see Sandford (1983) for a more detailed elaboration. In all 
three systems, key pastoral resources are reserved for particular times of the year, for 
example in the early rains when there is a flush of nutritious annual grasses on the desert 
margins and rain water is lying in pools on the surface, and in the late dry season when 
animals are tied to perennial water sources. The greatest competition for pastoral 
resources is at the height of the dry season when both water and fodder are scarce. At this 
time of the year, competition for land and water between different pastoral groups, and 
between pastoralists and settled agriculturalists is intense; it is generally the pastoralists 
who tend to come off worse (Appendices 6 and 7).  
In Southern Africa close herding of animals on communal land is now practiced only by 
small groups of agro-pastoralists. For example, in the communal areas of Botswana 
(Appendix 8) and Namibia, transhumance in the wet season has been increasingly 
curtailed over the last four decades by the enclosure of the range by commercial interests. 
For local stock keepers, the normal livelihood mode is now a sedentary one in which 
animals (unattended by herders) move out daily to pasture from a central ‘cattlepost’ 
(usually a pumped well and storage tank), to which they return at nightfall for watering 
and protection in a kraal.  
 
Both north and south of the equator, livestock on arid and semi-arid communal land are 
now more often coming under stress at the end of the long dry season as a result of rising 
                                                 
2 In terms of the UNDP human-development index 2005, 10 of the 32 ‘low-human-development’ countries 
in the world are African countries with large areas of semi-arid land. Measures of economic performance 
and human welfare in the semi-arid countries south of the Sahara (i.e. Burkina Faso, the Central African 
Republic, Chad, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Tanzania) reflect the poverty 
and vulnerability of their large populations of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists and agro-pastoralists.  
  4 
 
population, climate change and development pressures (particularly rangeland enclosure). 
Distances are at a maximum between watering points and the remaining grazing and 
browse; so also are daytime temperatures. Stephen Sandford (1983), in describing 
traditional strategies to overcome dry-season scarcity of resources, observes that the 
conservation of water and grazing at fall-back water points in most grazing areas of 
tropical Africa where group-based forms of land tenure prevail is beyond the control of 
the individual stock keeper: 
 
“There is seldom a formal policy imposed by a society's rules, formally agreed on 
by a community or decreed by a legitimate authority, with community-imposed 
rewards and sanctions for compliance”.  
 
Resource conservation is thus external to the management strategies of the individual 
pastoralist, and sometimes also beyond the capacity of the wider group. There is a parallel 
here with the growing water insecurity on irrigation schemes at critical times of year. In 
the worst-case scenario, which is currently visited upon the Horn and East Africa, drought 
results in the decimation of herds and flocks and the impoverishment of their owners.  
 
As Nathalie Gomes (2005, p. 42), based on field evidence from Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Somalia, concludes:  
 
“Pastoralist livelihoods have always been exposed to the vagaries of climate and 
harsh environmental conditions. However, in recent years, pastoralists have faced 
increasing competition for water and pastures in a context of decreased rangeland 
access.”  
 
The drought fall-back security of agro-pastoralists is deteriorating as more wetland 
ecosystems along river banks and lakeshores are eroded, as a result, for example, of 
irrigation development in Somalia (Appendix 5) and demographic pressure combined 
with climate change (as around Lake Chad). Dam construction poses a further problem, as 
seen in the case of the River Turkwel hydroelectric dam in Kenya: a third of the Turkana 
people are dependent, particularly in times of drought, upon a downstream riverine forest 
served by periodic river flow, and serious concerns have been raised that the dam will 
destroy their ability to keep livestock, thus forcing them to depend upon food aid (Adams 
1992, Hawley 2003). Finally there is a major issue of increasing settlement around dry 
season wells following the installation of government boreholes and power-driven pumps, 
which have had a tendency to change grazing and water resources from controlled access 
to open access (Appendices 5 and 6, and see Thébaud and Batterbury 2001). 
 
3.  PRINCIPLES AND EVOLUTION OF LAND AND WATER RIGHTS  
3.1.  Irrigation Rights 
Meinzen-Dick and Di Gregario (2004) propose that property rights are best understood as 
an overlapping ‘bundle’ of rights, limited not just to use and ownership but also covering 
‘control or decision-making’ rights, and they emphasise that there are multiple sources of 
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property rights. However, colonisation introduced a specific legal dualism to African land 
rights: the colonial powers imported systems of common and statute law for their own 
purposes, which they operated alongside existing customary practices. Post colonial states 
initially maintained this legal dualism: customary law prevailed in some areas of 
independent African countries’ geographical and social space, while statute law and 
imported common law prevailed in others (Adams and Turner 2005). 
 
With important qualifications, comparable issues also arise in relation to water rights. 
While land rights can be vested directly in a ‘legal person’ (an individual, a group, a 
company, a trust, etc.), a water right in statute law is a legal right to divert and/or impound 
and use water from a natural source (Hodgson 2004). Typically in irrigation schemes this 
water right is vested in the scheme’s management; the water rights of the individual 
farmer are subsidiary and derive from ownership of or use of land within the irrigation 
scheme. The enjoyment of this subsidiary right then depends on the effectiveness of the 
scheme management; the unpredictable characteristics of water resources require 
continuing active management if water rights are to be delivered and, even then, water 
security cannot always be guaranteed (a fact recognised in all irrigation water supply 
agreements). Moreover, if an individual diverts water directly from a natural source, the 
individual right is conditional on water of the required quality and quantity being 
available and thus is also dependent on management of the resource at the basin level. 
 
In the lower Nile Valley, irrigated land long ago acquired the characteristics of relatively 
secure private tenancies with subsidiary rights to an equitable share of the water diverted 
by the scheme manager (Appendices 1 and 2). Given also the certainty provided by 
assured and relatively abundant water supplies, and thus the relative ease of resource and 
scheme management, statute law has generally prevailed and the main issues in relation to 
the overall ‘bundle’ of rights have concerned associated ‘control or decision-making’ 
rights.  Both in Egypt (at least after 1952) and, especially, in Sudan (under tenancy terms) 
the rights of farmers were heavily circumscribed with, for example: limitations as to crop 
choice; imposition of a fixed irrigation service; centralised maintenance of the water 
distribution system; and constraints on the transfer of land rights. Over time, and to 
differing degrees, the two governments have sought to ease restrictions so as to allow 
farmers to respond to market forces and to shift responsibilities for lower-level irrigation 
operations to water user associations – WUAs (Vermillion 2004). The impacts on 
production, system performance, financing and equity have differed (Appendices 1 and 
2). The main challenge is to preserve relatively secure land and associated water use 
rights while strengthening and regulating farmer ‘control or decision-making’ rights in 
ways that promote sustainable and equitable development. 
 
Similar trends have characterised established irrigation in the closed or closing river 
basins of northern and southern Africa, but with the added complication that water 
constraints are intensifying and, in South Africa, there is a political imperative to 
redistribute past land and subsidiary water rights to the previously disadvantaged black 
majority. Again, statutory law has in general prevailed but the challenge is greater than in 
the lower Nile Valley since transfer of ‘control or decision-making’ rights to farmers and 
farmer organisations is threatened by increasing water shortages and, in South Africa, 
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rising tenure insecurity. Moreover, even if land ownership is secure, there can be a sharp 
decline in land values as irrigation supplies become less certain. Strengthened 
management of the resource and/or irrigation scheme can offset these problems, but only 
to a limited degree. Another strategy is that made possible by the South African National 
Water Act, 1998, which has transformed the way water is controlled from a system of 
rights based on land ownership (the ‘riparian system’) to one designed to allocate water 
equitably in the public interest (Republic of South Africa 2004). Such an approach has 
had some success in Australia, Chile, and the USA, but it has yet to be demonstrated 
whether it will be adequately regulated in South Africa. 
 
In well established irrigation schemes, statutory rights to irrigated land and subsidiary 
water rights have usually overwhelmed prior informal or customary practices and 
entitlements. In contrast, over wide regions of Africa, legal dualism persists and different 
sets of rights remain active and contentious. Tanzania can be taken as representative 
(Appendix 9). Typically, colonial regimes acting in the interests of expatriate investors 
seeking security of land ownership and dry season flows, or independent governments 
seeking ‘modern’ approaches to land and water management, introduced rights derived 
from the civil law or common law traditions of Europe. Modern water laws seek to 
formalise access to water through a permit system, perhaps initially confined to specific 
water bodies but subsequently generalised throughout the country. Exemption of de 
minimis water use is invariably provided, and there may be in-principle recognition of 
customary access rights. But the onus is typically placed on formal application and the 
payment of fees. Not only may informal users be unwilling to apply or pay for what they 
consider to be their inherent right to water, but they may fundamentally question the 
legitimacy of the formal system; indeed, it may lie beyond their cultural experience and 
understanding. As the formal permit system is progressively enforced, the two – or more 
– sources of legitimacy thus come increasingly into conflict.   
 
Land and associated water sources have an important spiritual value for many African 
people: land is not merely a factor of production but is first and foremost the medium 
which defines and binds social and spiritual relations, within and across generations. This 
cultural attachment to land typically proves resilient and competition for resources is 
dynamic and sustained. A customary right to use and divert water is regarded as inherent 
in the land itself. The government may seek to develop the institutions – organisations and 
procedures – necessary for enforcing a modern rights approach, but these may be ignored 
or resisted. Small-scale furrow irrigation is, for instance, developed irrespective of formal 
rights, and informal agreements for sharing low flows between neighbouring furrows and 
with domestic users persist in the face of formal rights that may give legal preference to 
large-scale irrigation and other modern uses (Appendix 4). 
 
Recognising informal/customary rights within formal rights legislation is no easy matter, 
and is further complicated when governments also seek to promote market responses 
and/or shift irrigation responsibilities to WUAs, that is, when the full ‘bundle’ of rights is 
taken into account (Vermillion 2004). This calls for caution in the further development of 
large-scale irrigation where this impacts on customary rights. It also suggests that the 
primary focus of governments should be on strengthening the management of the overall 
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resource and of irrigation where it is established (recognising customary rights to the 
extent that this proves feasible), rather than imposing rigid water rights (permit) 
legislation on small-scale users.   
3.2.  Pastoral Rights 
The vulnerability of pastoralists’ land and water rights in the arid and semi-arid savannas 
of Africa is rooted in the colonial era and the dominance of received statutory law. With 
the possible exception of hunter-gatherers, nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists and 
agro-pastoralists have probably suffered greater insecurity of tenure than any other land 
users. Initially, under the colonial-era policy of indirect rule, pastoralists occupying 
marginal land were left to their own devices. The official position of the British was that 
customary land rights should be respected, including the traditional land administration 
responsibilities of local leaders, and similar principles applied in Francophone countries. 
Tenure arrangements in pastoral areas thus remained largely intact during the colonial 
period and for some years after. 
 
For example, in Sudan, from the early years of the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium until 
1970, a grazier was free to use pasture and free-standing water in any part of his tribal 
area. Since this area often covered ten thousand square kilometres or more, there was 
considerable flexibility in the face of low and uncertain rainfall. Boundaries between 
tribes were defined by the Condominium government and could be crossed only after 
agreement between the tribes involved. The tribal leaders were charged with arbitration, 
enforcement of grazing regulations and inter-tribal agreements (Adams 1982). The 
subsequent breakdown of governance in Darfur was in part a result of a collapse in the 
local management of land and water resources, firstly on the part of traditional leaders and 
then that of the ‘People’s Local Government’ (Appendix 7). 
 
Under statutory law, the land and water rights of pastoralists in Africa have generally 
been ignored. In Sudan, for example, the Titles to Land Ordinance, 1899 recognised only 
the very small area of continuously cultivated and irrigable riverine land as private 
property and excluded from registration the vast areas of semi desert and savannah used 
by pastoralists. These areas were classified as government owned and either (i) subject to 
no right, or (ii) subject to usufruct rights of tribes. As elsewhere in Africa, usufruct rights 
were extinguished by government when it wished to set aside land for agricultural 
production schemes, both public and private (nomadism being regarded as a sociological 
problem and a threat to both sustainable land use and national security). In the Nile basin, 
extensive areas of traditional grazing land were ploughed up for large-scale rain-fed 
sorghum production and for irrigated wheat, cotton and groundnuts, a programme which 
began before independence (Shazali and Ahmed 1999).  
 
Mid 20
th century studies of customary land tenure in Africa revealed important variations 
in tenure arrangements between the different territories, reflecting the ethnic origin of the 
population and the prevailing land use systems – and varying particularly between 
sedentary and migratory systems of land use. One common characteristic, however, was 
the importance of community control over the means of subsistence, in order to achieve 
livelihood security and social continuity. Entitlements were retained as a result of the 
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performance of reciprocal obligations in the community, but communal rights transcended 
those of individuals and their immediate relatives - a view which was not lost on the 
colonial government of the day. Indeed, the legal opinion of the Privy Council in 1921 
was that African customary tenure admitted no individual property. This became a 
convenient tool for colonial administrations. Customary land was thenceforth held in trust 
by the colonial power and designated ‘Crown Land’, ‘Native Reserve’ or ‘Trust Land’. 
On attaining independence African governments have held on to this colonial principle, 
and this has reduced the cost of acquiring customary land for public purposes (Adams and 
Turner, 2005). 
 
For example, in Kenya, Section IX of the 1963 Constitution permits a modified and rather 
simplified form of land acquisition for Trust Land (i.e. communal land), referred to as 
‘setting apart’, which may be activated by the Head of State (in effect the Commissioner 
of Lands) or by County Councils. The vesting of both the title and the control of Trust 
Land in county councils, coupled with the allocation of administrative control to the 
Commissioner of Lands, meant that customary land tenure principles were hardly ever 
respected (Republic of Kenya 2002). Over the years, large areas of land, especially 
wetlands, riverine areas and other key resource areas, have been set apart for all manner 
of dubious purposes, very often ‘contrary to the provisions of the law’ (Republic of Kenya 
2004, p. 41).  
 
Given the dominance of statutory law and state control over much of land traditionally 
used by pastoralists in Africa, it is somewhat academic to dwell upon the group-based 
principles by which they have traditionally managed their land and water resources. 
However, these customary arrangements have been well-researched and shown to be 
often very sophisticated (for example see Niamir-Fuller 1990). Of particular relevance to 
the present paper is the information on pastoralists’ traditional strategies for overcoming 
shortages of water for livestock that has been brought together from numerous sources by 
Stephen Sandford (1983): 
 
•  The ‘investment strategy’ is to construct new water sources in water-deficit areas 
and/or invest in transport of water over comparatively short distances from water 
source to camp by donkey or camel  
 
•  The ‘composition strategy’ involves the balancing of appropriate species, age and 
sex composition of herds. 
 
•  The ‘positioning and conservation strategy’ involves two elements: the careful 
adjustment in space and time of the positions of different species and classes of 
livestock in relation to water supplies; and the conservation of the water and 
grazing at or around the most permanent and reliable water points (‘fallback’ or 
‘dry-season’ water points).  
 
•  The ‘husbandry strategy’ refers to management practices engaged in by livestock 
owners in order to overcome water shortage, primarily selection of more drought-
resistant breeding stock and management of the timing and frequency of drinking.  
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•  Finally, and of most interest in relation to land-water interactions, is the 
‘managing and controlling water points’ strategy, whereby ‘managing’ refers to 
the organization of watering activities and maintenance in such a way that the 
minimum of time and water is wasted, and ‘controlling’ refers to the regulation of 
access to a water source, and the restricting of access to the number of people or 
livestock for which the water and nearby grazing is adequate. The degree of 
management and control in different pastoral systems tends to vary with the 
scarcity of water, with the difficulty of extracting it, and/or with the amount of 
surrounding grass. Where human labour or other resources have been invested in 
the development of a water resource, then, even if water is not scarce, some 
nominal control of access is likely to prevail. Control of access to water usually 
only distinguishes persons with stronger or weaker claims to use a particular water 
point, and seldom, if ever, imposes formally regulated limits on water use, even in 
times of scarcity. However, informal limits may be imposed by the increased 
requirement in times of water scarcity for human labour to extract water and 
deliver it to livestock.  
 
The ‘managing and controlling water points’ strategy requires a greater degree of 
coordination and organisation of effort between different individuals or groups than the 
others, and generally requires some kind of authority structure to ensure observance of the 
rules and settle disputes. When this strategy breaks down, whether under the impact of 
rising population, climate change and/or development pressures, the consequences can be 
devastating (Appendices 5, 6 and 7). This points to the importance of having sound, well-
integrated and well-governed land and water rights administration and management. 
 
4.  LAND AND WATER RIGHTS ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT 
Except perhaps in Egypt and Sudan where there is a long tradition of integration on the 
riverine land of the Nile, the administration and management of land and water rights tend 
to be poorly integrated in Africa. Two other possible exceptions are Rwanda and Uganda, 
in which responsibility for water, land and the environment are now vested in a single 
ministry. 
4.1.  Land Administration and Management 
There are no universally agreed definitions of land administration and management. 
However, as used in this paper, ‘land administration’ refers to the process of determining, 
recording and disseminating information about the tenure, value and use of land 
(Williamson 2001). It is concerned with land survey, with the ‘incidents’ of land rights 
and the recording of land transactions, with land valuation, land registration and dispute 
resolution. ‘Land management’ refers to the planning and regulation of land as a 
resource from an environmental and an economic perspective. It relates to land use 
planning and/or physical planning, zoning, environmental protection measures and so on. 
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The land administration systems introduced by most colonial governments were very 
much influenced by the systems used in Europe – in France, Spain and Portugal – with the 
major exception of the land administration systems set up in British colonies, which were 
to a large extent influenced by the Torrens system that had been developed primarily for 
the colonisation of Australia and for the division of virgin land into parcels. However, the 
technical demands of most Torrens-influenced registration systems raise the survey cost 
beyond what is both necessary and affordable for rural African populations. Politicians 
and officials thus continue to use their discretionary power and influence over land 
allocation and revocation for political and personal advantage; landowners and land 
professionals often have vested interests in perpetuating the status quo.  
 
In the former British colonies, the land administration work of departments of ‘lands and 
surveys’ almost exclusively focused on the survey and registration of land alienated in 
terms of the received law, and on topographical mapping and frontier delimitation and 
boundary marking. Colonial land ordinances conferred enormous powers on governments 
to grant non-African settlers land for agricultural development and for residential 
purposes in towns.  
 
Following independence, few African countries have tried to expand the formal land 
registration system to areas under customary tenure, least of all the low value grazing land 
used by pastoralists. In practice, most sub-Saharan countries have faced tremendous 
difficulties even maintaining the formal registration system in areas where it is used. Most 
land ministries struggle to overcome backlogs of thousands of dispositions (applications 
for land leases, transfers of ownership, subdivisions, etc.). Land administration continues 
to be seen as a routine public administration function, neither skills-based nor 
distinguishable from the other functions ordinarily performed by public agencies. 
Personnel are often transferred across government departments, and hence have no job 
security by reason of the professional services they provide (Okoth-Ogendo 2002). 
 
Formal land management (i.e. the regulation of land use) is very largely non-existent in 
Africa. Again, this is a colonial legacy. In the colonial period, if land management 
featured at all, it was geared to the planning of principal administrative centres, to 
purposeless rural land-use planning in rural areas by expatriate ‘experts’ (Dalal-Clayton 
1991), and to the oversight and control of the ‘native reserves’. The record in this last-
mentioned area has been most undistinguished. Okoth-Ogendo (2002, p. 7) points to: 
 
“the disequilibration of the commons as a social, cultural and economic system 
upon which the livelihoods of rural communities depend. That has arisen not only 
from the relocation of radical title to common property resources from 
communities to the State, but more seriously from the administrative interventions 
directed at the suppression of customary land law and indigenous technologies of 
production. This phenomenon is, arguably, at the root of under-development and 
poverty in much of rural Africa”. 
 
Pre and post-independence, the concern of most authorities has not been “to design, 
prescribe, enforce and guarantee the integrity of performance standards in land resource 
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management” (Okoth-Ogendo (2002, p. 2), but to alienate and excise from the commons 
key resource areas vital to the survival of pastoralists at critical times of the year.  
 
In sub-Saharan Africa over the past decade, most countries have been engaged – at 
various levels of detail – in evaluating their land policies and laws, especially regarding 
the relative status of customary and statutory tenure (Okoth-Ogendo 1998 and 2002). 
With the exception of Kenya (discussed below in Section 5), few of these policies have 
paid attention to the need for a closer alignment of land and water rights management and 
administration. In some instances, land policies have called for more direct government 
control over wetlands but as a resource to be developed and exploited. For example, 
Rwanda’s land policy calls for ‘marshlands’ to be declared public land and their use 
subject to government ‘concessions’ (Republic of Rwanda 2005, p. 40).  
 
Many reforms have been proposed but the record of implementation has so far been 
disappointing. Long delays have surrounded land law harmonisation, institutional change 
and capacity development. In the struggle for scarce budgetary resources, the land sector 
has barely featured. The problem is compounded when governments fail to consider, 
during the drafting phase, the costs of implementing policies and laws and thus do not 
introduce more affordable options before new laws are promulgated (for example in 
Uganda, see Bosworth 2003, Hunt 2004). Experience suggests that institutional 
constraints to the implementation of land policy reform are the most dominant (McAuslan 
2003; DFID and Adams 2004; Daley and Hobley 2005).  
4.2.  Irrigation Water Management  
The distinction between land administration and land management also applies to water 
resources, but with the proviso that, whereas land is immobile, water comprises both a 
stock and a (variable) flow. Thus, as suggested earlier in this paper, whereas land 
management is relatively passive, management of water resources must be an active and 
continuing function designed to satisfy water rights in real time within the limits of the 
available resource (Hodgson 2004). Water administration is comparable to land 
administration in that it is concerned with the registration of water permits and related 
activities. However, there is little purpose in adopting a formal permit administration 
system if the pre-conditions for effective water management are absent. Management 
(rather than administration) of the resource is thus invariably the priority. In the absence 
of a developed water control infrastructure, management is necessarily reactive (though 
still active), being primarily concerned with the sharing of the water resource during dry 
periods. Customary (often informal) sharing practices are sustainable at a local level but 
statutory provisions are required in the broader context, for example in a river basin. 
However, once significant hydraulic engineering works are put in place, positive 
management is implied.  
 
Colonial governments generally enforced the operating rules for dams, pumping stations, 
public irrigation schemes etc. through strong central management. Though they often 
failed to recognise customary rights and deprived traditional small-scale users of 
established water entitlements, they were generally effective in meeting the demands of 
commercial users and sometimes provided them with formal rights (Appendix 8).   
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Sophisticated management of complex inter-connected water systems, such as that of the 
Orange-Vaal system of South Africa, also evolved. Within large-scale irrigation 
commands, the subsidiary rights of landowners were also generally met according to a 
predictable operational plan.  
 
So long as water remained relatively abundant, resource management and service delivery 
have remained broadly effective. In the lower Nile Valley, for instance, water control 
infrastructure has been further developed with the construction of large dams and related 
structures, of which the High Aswan dam is emblematic, facilitating perennial supplies 
where previously only seasonal irrigation could be assured (Appendix 1). But in closing 
river basins, resource management and service delivery must address increasingly 
uncertain supplies. Though the rhetoric of equitable deliveries may be asserted, in practice 
there is scope for direct interference by those in an advantageous position – high in the 
basin, at the head of an irrigation scheme – and for allocation bias by basin and scheme 
managers. Water allocation and distribution has thus in many cases become less 
manageable and predictable, depriving those without ‘voice’ of accustomed supplies, 
even where the control infrastructure appears to be in place. In the absence of control 
infrastructure, the rhetoric and the practice are typically even more disconnected.     
 
Rather than stepping back and focusing on simplifying and adapting management to attain 
predictable objectives, governments have too often adopted over-ambitious policies. This 
has been influenced by the emerging integrated water resource management (IWRM) 
consensus, and includes approaches that have often only recently been introduced in 
developed countries with strong administrative traditions. In Tanzania, for instance, a 
substantive effort has been made to develop organisations at basin level, but rather than 
focusing on attainable resource planning, management and conflict resolution functions, 
WUAs have also been assigned the administration of a formal permit system covering all 
uses including local furrow irrigation. Moreover, their operations are funded from water 
charges and conflicts have developed (Appendices 4 and 9, and, as is similarly the case in 
Zimbabwe and Sudan, Appendices 10 and 11). In other countries, the institutions for 
water resource management are almost wholly absent. In Ethiopia, for instance, 
Proclamation 92/1994 provided for a water permit system and Proclamation 197/2000 
identified the Ministry of Water Resources as the responsible agency. But in practice 
there is still no institutional capacity either to plan or manage the resource, and the permit 
system remains defunct.
 
4.3.  The Gap Between Policy and Practice 
Past disappointments have reflected the over-optimism of advocates of water policy 
reform in Africa and their failure to address the particular constraints associated with poor 
administration. Too often standardised solutions have been imposed without sufficient 
recognition of local differences in management practices and traditional/customary 
entitlements, the result of which is a disconnectedness between policy and practice. This 
apples to both land and water when treated as sectorally separate, as the foregoing 
discussion has already shown, but it applies even more at the junctures of land and water 
interactions, with often negative consequences for the water entitlements (and land rights) 
of poor and marginalised people in Africa. This has been the case, for example, in Sudan 
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with the expropriation of pastoralist grazing rights during registration of irrigated land 
(Appendix 2), and in Somalia with the deterioration of longstanding relationships between 
farmers and pastoralists that were important to both groups’ livelihoods (Appendix 5). It 
is most obviously the case, also, with the development of boreholes in many of Africa’s 
pastoral areas: this is often done with the stated aim of improving pastoralists’ access to 
water, but at the same time tends to be based on false assumptions about the nature of 
pastoral water and land rights and entitlements which equate traditional group-based 
‘control or decision-making’ rights with the notion that grazing and water are somehow 
open access public goods. The result is normally the collapse of local management and 
control and reduced access to the resources on the part of established users, as the 
examples from Somalia and Niger show (Appendices 5 and 6).  
 
Women’s water entitlements and land rights are another commonly cited example of 
those which are negatively affected by the disconnectedness between policy and practice, 
as examples from Sudan, The Gambia and Sierra Leone all show (Appendix 3). In these 
cases the problems arise for women because their rights to land (and to water entitlements 
accessed through rights to land) are often ‘secondary’ in Africa, by which is usually 
meant that they are ‘derived’ through men. Major resource policy changes have often had 
very negative consequences for women in terms of loss of entitlements because the nature 
of the practices through which they obtain access to water and land resources have not 
always been fully taken into consideration. 
   
A final example of rural water supply administration in Zimbabwe (Appendix 10) also 
illustrates this point about disconnectedness. Recent efforts to promote the use of water 
for commercial (chargeable) purposes in the communal land areas are increasing demand 
for water, yet access to the formal permits that are required for the commercial use of 
water is tied to having title deeds for land, which most people in the communal areas do 
not have. In practice, then, access to water for commercial purposes in these areas still 
relies heavily on customary land and water rights, which include the notion that no-one 
should be denied access to water because of its inextricable link to livelihoods. Many 
‘private’ sources of water are thus in effect ‘public’, and water is showing no sign yet of 
commodifying in the same way as land.
3   
 
5.  CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN POLICY AND PRACTICE 
5.1.  The scope, timing and level of implementation 
For the reform of land and water rights to have a significant impact on poverty reduction 
they must be part of a broader process of political, social and economic change, rather 
than narrow sectoral interventions. As discussed in section 4 of this paper, many reforms 
have been proposed but the record of implementation has been disappointing. It is 
apparent that the pace of reform cannot reasonably run ahead of advances in other related 
                                                 
3 See also Woodhouse, Bernstein and Hulme’s (2000) collection of recent studies on the enclosure of 
wetlands in Africa’s drylands, which illustrate the growing commodification of land and the widening gap 
between winners and losers from the changing terms of access to water and land. 
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functions, for example the provision of physical infrastructure and technical support 
services to small-scale farmers, or the control of epizootics in livestock. Nor can it run 
ahead of the capacity of governments to democratize the administration and management 
of natural resource tenure and coordinate the process in an even-handed, transparent and 
efficient manner.  
 
In a review of institutional design for water rights reform in Medium Human 
Development Countries (China, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa) and High Human 
Development Countries (Australia, Spain, USA) the editors (Bruns et al 2005, p. 294) 
conclude: 
 
“…..that water rights reform takes time, and that timing should be carefully 
considered in reforming water allocation institutions. Efforts to reform water 
rights may yield little benefit if pushed too soon, too quickly, or without 
appropriate synchronization between different components of institutional 
change.” 
 
Further, with regard to customary rights (p. 291-2):  
 
“The formulation of new water laws without understanding of existing systems is 
particularly problematic, but even codification itself can rigidify and distort 
customary systems….Mexico required registration within a deadline, or else rights 
would not receive legal protection. Such deadlines may be included in laws 
without much thought about their implications for customary rights, and without 
consideration of alternatives that better protect existing uses and avoid disrupting 
local institutions for water management. Indonesia’s new water law takes a 
different approach, recognizing basic rights for small-scale use, without requiring 
registration.” 
 
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that, for the great majority of sub-Saharan countries, 
far-reaching water management reform will not be feasible in the foreseeable future. For 
many countries, the same disheartening conclusion applies to land tenure reform.  
 
As also highlighted in section 4.3, the review of case studies summarized in the 
appendices to this paper suggests that land and water rights are disconnected mainly in the 
national policy arena, as evidenced by attempts to overwrite more flexible customary 
arrangements with formal approaches. Yet for the livelihood strategies of pastoralists and 
small-scale irrigators, it is vital that land and water rights are closely linked, just as they 
were on the banks of the lower Nile over two thousand years ago (Madbouly 2005).  
 
Bruns et al (2005) warn that reforming water allocation institutions faces many risks and 
may get bogged down in policy debate or be stalemated. New laws and regulations may 
remain unimplemented because they are opposed by powerful stakeholders. Reforms may 
consume great effort but yield little impact. These problems have their parallel in attempts 
to reform land allocation institutions. Thus, in promoting new approaches, advocates for 
  15 
 
the reform of resource tenure have little alternative but to continue to labour at the coal 
face – namely at the local level. 
5.2.  Local-level water management interventions 
Potential points of intervention should now be identified that reflect local realities. They 
should seek to balance the essential role of government in setting policy frameworks that 
protect the water entitlements of the poor with a much greater sensitivity to local realities 
than has typified the past, and by utilising alliances with civil society (see Daley and 
Hobley 2005 for this argument with respect to land). 
 
The case of the SOS-Sahel intervention in Sudan (Appendix 11) which went to court and 
was decided in favour of the Warshal Water Management Committee provides an 
example - literally a ‘test case’ - which has the potential for wider application across 
Sudan. Some recommendations emerging from the meeting with the State Water 
Corporation, other government branches, civil society organisations and the judiciary are 
listed in the bullet points at the end of Appendix 11. The follow-up of such a case could 
have implications for capacity development of the various stakeholders. 
  
Similar practical lessons could be learned by local-level interventions which serve to 
protect and strengthen the resource tenure of small-scale irrigators who are vulnerable to 
dysfunctional centralised decision-making. Efforts should be made to: build on customary 
systems of dispute resolution; help the poor obtain compensation if water is taken away; 
enable water titling irrespective of land title; and work with the authorities to vest water 
rights in WUAs.   
5.3.  Scheme level 
At a scheme level, the functions of water resource management, water service delivery 
and water administration should be kept distinct. They should be addressed separately and  
assigned to different organisations. Other related functions (such as those of planning, 
finance, data and conflict resolution) must be distributed amongst them, for example:  
-  data collection functions assigned to a resource management entity would 
comprise monitoring the quantity and quality of the water resource;  
-  to service delivery entities it would comprise the monitoring of deliveries to 
individual customers; and 
-  to water administration the monitoring of flows to ensure consistency with 
diversion and discharge permits.   
 
Water resource management should be simplified to accord with what is practicable and 
achievable in a basin and sub-basin context. Strengthen resource data and planning 
functions as the base for management and incorporate land considerations in water plans. 
Invest in feasible water control infrastructure to support appropriate and achievable 
management plans. Decentralise to the extent realistic, for example by building on local 
conflict resolution and similar practices. 
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Simplify irrigation service delivery in existing systems, supported by appropriate 
remodelling of the infrastructure. Decentralise maintenance and management to WUAs in 
large irrigation schemes. Recognise and strengthen local furrow irrigation organisations. 
Be cautious in developing new major irrigation schemes, in particular when they impact 
on customary access by furrow irrigators, pastoralists, non-land-based users etc. 
 
Adopt formal water rights systems only when management is effective. Issue formal 
permits only to those that can realistically pay water charges. Recognise small-scale users 
and collective uses without necessarily bringing them into the formal permit 
administration. Fund resource management either from the budget or from charges on 
major users such as power companies, public irrigation and urban utilities. 
5.4.  Pastoral issues 
The case studies in the appendices, which briefly describe some of the land and water 
problems threatening the livelihoods of pastoralists across the region, provide little scope 
for optimism. The current drought in the Horn and East Africa is exacerbating decades of 
insecurity and armed conflict, to which ill-judged water development projects have 
contributed. Gomes (2005), on the basis of her survey in Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, 
finds that the most effective strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of water supply 
infrastructure have been initiated by the pastoralists themselves who are urging their 
closure. She reports that new directives and policies are coming from development 
agencies and governments. This would be encouraging but for the fact that these problems 
were identified in the 1970s in western Sudan, when it was noted that the large number of 
water points being installed would be disastrous because they undermined long-
established grazing agreements and encouraged the mushrooming of settlements and crop 
cultivation across migration routes. Fortunately within a few years, most of the pumps had 
broken down due to lack of maintenance.  
 
The great hope for pastoralists is that one day they will be given real control over their 
own pastoral water sources and the opportunity to create institutions by which these can 
be communally administered and managed by the users. In the draft Kenya National Land 
Policy, it is precisely such a measure that is being recommended. All Communal Land, 
currently held in trust by County Councils, is to be vested in and be held by community-
based institutions created by legislation and entrenched in the constitution. Recommended 
by the Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya (Republic of Kenya 
2002), this reform was agreed by the National Constitutional Conference on the 15
th of 
March 2004 and endorsed by the National Land Policy Formulation Process (Ministry of 
Lands 2005), in which representatives of Kenya’s pastoralists participated. If and when 
the long-awaited new constitution is finally promulgated, the implementation of such a 
fundamental reform will be closely monitored across the region for the lessons that can be 
learnt from it for more productive, sustainable and, above all, equitable development of 
land and water resources. 
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Appendix 1: Egyptian Land and Water Rights 
 
In arid Egypt, water ownership is vested in the State and rights to its use are generally 
determined by rights to land. Lands in the old settled areas of the Nile valley and delta are 
now predominantly privately owned, though land ownership is hedged by conditions that 
have varied in response to shifting political and economic priorities (for example with 
respect to the level and form of land taxes, the size of holdings, the terms of tenure and 
land use). Lands in new settlements are mainly held as leases of public land. 
 
Nineteenth century land reforms abolished tax farming (i.e. assigning responsibility for 
tax revenue collection to private citizens), formalised the land tax and adjusted ownership 
to promote the production and payment of taxes. This was successful in encouraging 
agricultural output but also led to the emergence of very inequitable patterns of private 
ownership.  The 1952 land reform therefore sought to limit holding size and protect tenant 
farmers within a centralised (socialist) agricultural policy that largely determined how 
land and water could be used. While successful in enhancing equity, these changes 
impacted adversely on agricultural growth and diversification and were partially reversed 
in the 1990s with the new aims of promoting land markets and easing tenancy restrictions 
while simultaneously increasing farmers’ choices on land and water use; agricultural 
production responded, but at the expense of some dispossession and of increased 
insecurity for tenant farmers.   
 
Rights to the use of water from canals constructed by the State have under the Civil Code 
generally accompanied, and been in proportion to, the land holding to be irrigated and are 
also transferable when ownership of the land holding changes. However, the State has 
retained ultimate powers to modify water distribution – and hence accompanying 
subsidiary water rights – in accordance with national objectives, reflected for instance in 
priority to urban and industrial users. The distinction between perennial and seasonally-
irrigated land was largely ended with the construction of the Aswan dam, but cultivation 
of rice and sugar is still in principle controlled. In sympathy with Islamic tradition, no 
charges are made for water as a substance, but differential land taxes have been imposed 
(for example to reflect the relative water supplies associated with perennial, seasonal and 
paddy irrigation) and the costs of water delivery are in principle increasingly being 
transferred to water user associations (WUAs) and urban users.
1  
 
Most land outside the Nile Valley remains in public ownership, and can be alienated to 
private ownership or control in various ways.  Within new settlement areas, this has 
typically – at least initially – taken the form of long-leases subject to conditions requiring 
beneficial use, the adoption of water-saving techniques (for example the use of drip or 
sprinkler irrigation) and the avoidance of high water using crops. However, public land, 
                                                 
1 The Qur’anic view holds that everything on the earth was created for humankind as God’s bounty 
(ni’amah) to be exercised with care as a trusteeship (amana). The question of individual ownership over 
water – in contrast to usufruct or access rights - is a matter of Islamic debate. In contrast to classical Islamic 
theory in which all land is held in trust for the benefit of the community, water rights over individual lands 
were bought and sold during the Ottoman period, and this continues to this day (UN-HABITAT 2005).  
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especially in urban and peri-urban areas, has also been alienated more directly to private 
interests, providing ample opportunities for rent-seeking and other abuses. Land 
administration in general has proven problematic in Egypt and, although water resource 
management eased as a result of the control provided by the Aswan dam, political and 
administrative constraints have severely affected the government’s ability to recover the 
costs of water delivery in both urban and – more particularly – rural areas.  
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(LAG-I-00-99-00017-00 Task Order 815), Development Alternatives Inc. and IRG, 
12-13 June 2003 
Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation: Water for the future: national water policy 
2017, draft version, Cairo, Egypt, July 2004 
UN-HABITAT: Islam, Land & Property Research Series Paper 1: Islamic Land Theories 
and Their Application, 2005  
http://www.unhabitat.org/programmes/landtenure/publications.asp
Sir William Wilcocks: Egyptian Irrigation, Second Edition, 2 Vols., London, 1913 
 
 
  22 
 
Appendix 2: Sudanese Land and Water Rights 
 
A dichotomy exists in Sudan between shifting use of the vast rangelands and intensive use 
of the irrigated lands along the Nile. Traditionally rangelands were held in common, being 
allocated by tribal leaders for individual usage for sporadic cultivation and/or grazing.  
Shared access to water (in particular during the dry season) was an integral part of the 
communal management of land. In contrast, irrigated land involves fixed assets and from 
the early stages of development came to assume the characteristics of private ownership 
as riparian rights to water evolved to complement emerging private land rights. At first 
the colonial government sought to regularise private ownership, as in Egypt. But it 
became clear that this led to inequities greater even than those in Egypt, as rural people 
with little appreciation of the value of newly-regularised land sold out to urban and 
immigrant interests. Constraints were hence placed on private land transfers, rationalised 
in terms of a desire to support the development of small-scale family farms.  
 
These processes had two main drawbacks. First, formal land registration failed to 
recognise the subtleties of traditional access by expropriating nomadic rights to grazing, 
passage and watering points and by undermining traditional social and gender rights. 
Second, by preserving small family farms, registration limited investment capacity. This 
drawback was addressed in a unique way that also, however, paid little regard to 
traditional forms of access. Moreover, a form of management, though termed a 
partnership between government, private investors/managers and ‘tenant’ farmers, was in 
practice imposed on existing farmers. Control of land and water was assumed by 
government and, though land ownership rights were recognised, rents were nominal and 
larger holdings were in part nationalised. Large-scale irrigation (notably in the Gezira) 
was developed in a technically-rational manner with each of the ‘partners’ receiving a 
specified share of profits said to be in line with their contribution to farming costs. The 
shares were set out in legislation in which the tenants had little if any say. Landholders 
were given preference in the allocation of tenancies but tenants received a uniform 
holding irrespective of prior ownership and were required to follow a strict cultivation 
regime. Once their contractual rights came to an end, the private management entities 
were then replaced by public corporations.  
 
These arrangements, initially, favoured (overseas) commercial interests and, 
subsequently, the public sector, and they undermined traditional access to land in 
specified areas. However, they have also promoted agricultural production and led in due 
course to the evolution of a relatively prosperous (male-dominated) tenant farming 
community. Numerous changes have occurred over time to the cultivation regime, the 
size of tenancies in new schemes and the rights of the different partners - partly in an 
effort to increase farmer independence and their role in lower level irrigation. Massive 
investments in irrigation rehabilitation have also been undertaken with ambiguous results. 
Yet the underlying partnership structure remains to this day and the agricultural surpluses 
produced, in particular of cotton, have been a pillar of the Sudanese economy. 
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Sources: 
Mustafa Babiker: ‘Land Reform - Sudan Country Case Study’, draft paper for workshop 
on Equitable Access to Land and Water Resources, Beirut, Lebanon, 28-30 
November 2005   http://www.surf-as.org/LandWaterWorkshop/LandWater.html
Tony Barnett: The Gezira Scheme: An Illusion of Development, London: Frank Cass, 
1977 
Arthur Gaitskell: Gezira – a Story of Development in the Sudan, London: Faber and 
Faber, 1959 
Herve L. Plusquellec: The Gezira Irrigation Scheme in Sudan: Objectives, Design and 
Performance, The World Bank, May 1990 
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Appendix 3: Women’s Land and Water Rights in Sudan, Gambia and Sierra Leone 
 
Women’s interlinked rights to land and water for productive use have been negatively 
affected by both state-led and private sector developments in Africa. Water development 
schemes have often had a negative impact on women’s water rights, entailed through an 
accompanying loss of their land rights, as the examples from Sudan and The Gambia 
show. However, water investments on other people’s land can also pose problems for 
women, as the example from Sierra Leone shows. 
 
Sudan 
At Wad al Abbas village in Northern Sudan, an irrigated cotton and sorghum 
development scheme established in 1954 reduced women’s land ownership and their 
ability to secure their own livelihoods. In this largely Muslim area men were traditionally 
the main farmers, but women had land rights and participated in certain agricultural tasks. 
However, although the scheme incorporated virtually all agricultural land in the village, it 
was only men who received irrigated tenancies; some women later inherited their 
husbands’ tenancies, but cultural and religious norms prevented most women from 
farming and managing any land they did have.  
 
Like the more famous Gezira Scheme across the Blue Nile, the Wad al Abbas scheme was 
based on the assumption that a man’s wife and children farmed with him. In practice, 
however, it resulted in a switch from family farming to the use of hired labour, freeing up 
men to move into more lucrative activities including, increasingly, labour migration to 
Saudi Arabia, which by the late 1980s had contributed locally to increasing religious 
fundamentalism. Meanwhile, the most unpleasant and lowest paid cotton-picking work in 
the scheme was institutionalised as female work, allowing some (usually poorer) women 
to earn ‘pocket money’, but it did not offer most women the opportunity to earn 
significant cash incomes. As the local economy became more monetised, women thus 
became more secluded from public life and more dependent on their husbands for cash. 
Yet, rather than harming them through the loss of their land and water rights, it may be 
that some women (and men) in Wad al Abbas view the changes triggered by the 
establishment of the scheme as having freed them up to live a life more in keeping with 
the tenets of their faith.  
 
The Gambia 
In contrast, in The Gambia, where women had traditionally cultivated rice since at least 
the eighteenth century, irrigated rice development schemes directly reduced women’s 
control of land as male household heads established a tradition of irrigated plots 
belonging to men. Conflicts over women’s land and water rights began in the late 1940s 
in The Gambia, when colonial interventions to improve access to riverine swamps 
through the construction of causeways and footbridges doubled the area of tidal rice 
cultivation; women began clearing swamp land and claiming individual ownership rights, 
yet land incorporated into rice development schemes was normally leased to men. In 
response to these conflicts, the 1984 Jahaly Pacharr project set out to register a large 
number of irrigated plots in women’s names; in practice, however, the plots were 
identified as household land (under men’s control) because their husbands’ names were 
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also recorded beside them. As the project absorbed almost all the swamp rice fields in the 
area, women thus lost their formerly individually owned plots to the household. Mandinka 
women who had primarily depended on swamp rice cultivation for their livelihoods 
became a semi-proletarianised reserve labour force, hiring themselves out to work on 
others’ plots in order to earn their own cash; however local Fula, Wolof and Serrahuli 
women were less affected as they additionally had upland plots of their own. 
 
Sierra Leone 
In Sierra Leone modern approaches to water management have altered social relations 
among the Mende. Mende women have traditional social obligations to manage water for 
activities such as shallow-water fishing; they make and own scoop-nets and choose how 
to dispose of their own fish catches (either for consumption or sale), and there is a 
traditional connection between fishing and female rites of passage. However, legislation 
allowing mining companies to create artificial reservoirs has left Mende women in 
affected communities unable to participate in shallow-water fishing while their men 
continue deep-water fishing using canoes and gill nets; this has transformed gender 
relations and left women with reduced access to their traditional rights to the water 
needed for their livelihoods. 
 
Sources: 
Fenda A. Akiwumi: ‘What role do women take in Sierra Leone’s water management?’ 
ID21 Research Highlight 27 January 2006  http://www.id21.org/getweb/n6fa1g1.html  
From Fenda A. Akiwumi, ‘Indigenous people, women and water: the importance of 
local knowledge for project planning in an African context’, in Jonathan Chenoweth 
and Juliet Bird (eds.), The Business of Water and Sustainable Development, 188-197, 
Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing, 2005 
Victoria Bernal: ‘Losing Ground – Women and Agriculture on Sudan’s Irrigated 
Schemes: Lessons from a Blue Nile Village’, in Jean Davison (ed.), Agriculture, 
Women and Land – The African Experience, Boulder, USA: Westview Press Inc., 
1988 
Victoria Bernal: ‘Colonial Moral Economy and the Discipline of Development: The 
Gezira Scheme and “Modern” Sudan’, Cultural Anthropology, 12, 4, 447-479, 1997  
http://www.anthro.uci.edu/html/People/Fac%20Bios/Fac%20Pubs%20PDFs/Bernal-
CA2.pdf
Victoria Bernal: ‘Migration, Modernity and Islam in Rural Sudan’, Middle East Report 
211, Summer 1999  http://www.merip.org/mer/mer211/211_bernal.html
Judith Carney: ‘Struggles Over Land and Crops in an Irrigated Rice Scheme: The 
Gambia’, in Jean Davison (ed.), Agriculture, Women and Land – The African 
Experience, Boulder, USA: Westview Press Inc., 1988 
Jennie Dey: ‘Gambian Women: Unequal Partners in Rice Development Projects?’ 
Journal of Development Studies, 17, 3, 109-22, 1981 
FAO Gender and Development Service: 'Access to water: a woman’s right?' ID21 
Research Highlight 7 April 2005  http://www.id21.org/nr/r1fa1g1.html From Water 
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and people – whose right is it?, Food and Agriculture Organization summary report, 
2004  
Michael J. Watts: ‘Idioms of Land and Labor: Producing Politics and Rice in 
Senegambia’, in Thomas Bassett and Donald Crummey (eds.), Land in African 
Agrarian Systems, USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993 
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Appendix 4: Indigenous Small-Scale Irrigation in East Africa 
 
There is a broad continuum in African indigenous irrigation from simple adaptation to 
natural flood patterns in wetland areas to controlled diversion and lift irrigation systems. 
One example of indigenous controlled irrigation described by Adams (1992) is hill furrow 
irrigation by the Marakwet on the western side of the Rift Valley in Kenya. Agriculture is 
combined with pastoralism, with the women responsible for cultivation and the men for 
both herding and the construction, maintenance and operation of irrigation canals. The 
water from hill torrents is diverted by brushwood dams and carried by these canals via a 
variety of structures – canals, wooden aqueducts, and stone reinforced terraces – to the 
valley floor where irrigation of millets and sorghum takes place by simple flooding.   
Regular maintenance requires substantial labour, and has therefore come under increasing 
pressure as young men emigrate for work. Numerous sections of the canals have been 
repaired or rebuilt with cement structures by various outside agencies, but this has had 
mixed results. 
 
Another example of indigenous controlled irrigation is the expansion of paddy on the 
Usangu plains of the Great Ruaha river basin in Tanzania, again as a component of a 
mixed irrigation, dryland and livestock system. Paddy was introduced in the 1930s by 
Baluchi settlers in this then sparsely populated area, but was then expanded both by 
settlers and by aid-funded irrigation schemes that pre-empted the exploitation of land and 
water by immigrant farmers. Small rivers coming off the escarpment are diverted where 
they enter the plains, for paddy in the wet season and for domestic use and limited mixed 
cropping in the dry season. However, brushwood diversion dams must be rebuilt after 
each flood (perhaps several times a year) and earthen canals require heavy maintenance; 
this entails cooperation between irrigators, while leakage facilitates regular renewal of 
sharing agreements between the farmers of neighbouring furrows. In contrast, the 
concrete weirs of formal irrigation systems can capture the full flow of the river at times 
of shortage; in principle diversion is managed for equity, but in practice diversion gates 
are left open thereby diverting the full flow of the river into the canal. The World Bank 
has also funded the construction of concrete weirs for some local furrows with similar 
results: concrete weirs require less regular maintenance but when major repairs are 
required they are beyond the capacity of the farmers who must then depend on 
government, and local cooperation and water sharing have also been undermined. The 
local basin agency is promoting the formation of water user associations and sub-basin 
committees in order to try to manage these problems, but this is being compromised by 
the concurrent introduction of water permits and water charges (see also Appendix 9). 
 
These government and donor-funded schemes in Tanzania have generally performed 
poorly and have been a heavy drain on the public purse.  In contrast, paddy remains a 
profitable crop for small-scale farmers, and it is clear that the local system of hill furrows 
would have expanded in the absence of the public schemes up to the limits of the resource 
and at no cost to the government.  As it is, cultivation has spread at the tail of canals 
served by concrete weirs, and on drainage flows below inefficient public schemes, and 
land served by furrows diverting water below the concrete weirs has at least in part been 
abandoned.    
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Sources: 
William M. Adams: Wasting the rain: rivers , people and planning in Africa,  London: 
Earthscan, 1992 
Hunting Technical Services et al: Sustainable Management of the Usangu Wetland and its 
Catchment,  Final Report of a consultancy study prepared on behalf of the 
Government of Tanzania and funded by DFID, March 2001 
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Appendix 5: Loss of Grazing and Water Rights in Somalia
1
 
For decades, large internationally-funded water development schemes have been 
considered the foundation of local development in the predominantly pastoral economy of 
Somalia. Yet they have also had negative effects for the environment, while their 
inequities and political manipulation have contributed to Somalia’s continuing civil strife. 
 
Along the southern rivers (the Juba and Shebelle), where conditions are suitable for 
sedentary agriculture, past water investments aimed to develop large-scale irrigated 
intensive agricultural systems. However, these dispossessed both small-scale Bantu-
Somali farmers and Somali pastoralists of critical livelihood assets. Previously, small-
scale farmers co-operated seasonally with local pastoralists – pastoral livestock were 
allowed to access crop remnants and other forage resources, and this helped to clear and 
enrich the farmers’ soils. The new large-scale farming schemes interrupted this 
relationship, leading to conflict between the two groups. The Agricultural Land Law of 
1975, which nationalised all land, also gave the state responsibility for maintaining rivers 
and canals (taking it away from customary institutions); since 1991 the chaos of civil war 
has resulted in a suspension of maintenance work and hence major problems for irrigated 
agriculture, although NGOs have been experimenting with new community-based 
approaches to irrigation management since 2003. Meanwhile, as the growing number of 
irrigation canals encroached on the pastoralists’ dry season grazing areas and the 
allocation of leasehold land became increasingly subject to political manipulation under 
the pre-civil war regime, Somali pastoralists also began to diversify into irrigated riverine 
agriculture; demand for such land has steadily increased since the 1960s. 
 
In areas of Somalia dominated by pastoral production systems, past water development 
schemes in the form of borehole development more directly reshaped seasonal land use 
patterns, increasing overall livestock population density and shifting herd composition 
from more drought-resistant animals such as camels and small ruminants towards less 
drought-resistant but more-marketable cattle. Herds – and livelihoods – therefore became 
more profitable, but also more vulnerable to droughts and market dynamics; at the same 
time the increasing number of boreholes reduced pastoralists’ former reliance on their 
relationships with the Bantu-Somali farmers of the southern riverine areas. However, the 
nature of pastoralists’ water rights also changed fundamentally with past schemes: on 
Somali ranges the only public goods, open to all herders and herds, were natural water 
sources (streams or natural springs), yet new water investments by government, 
international donors and NGOs were also treated as public goods (based on false 
assumptions about the nature of pastoral water and land rights and entitlements). Grazing 
areas that had traditionally been associated with the specific pastoralist group who had 
control of the local man-made water source then became openly accessible to all herders, 
creating tensions between different pastoralist groups and between them and the agencies 
responsible for the particular schemes; water development schemes have often been 
targeted in Somalia’s civil war, while, on the specific request of local communities, many 
                                                 
1 This appendix was inspired by and draws heavily on material provided by Michele Nori from the EC 
Marie-Curie-funded Milking Drylands research initiative. 
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water points that have become inoperable have not been rehabilitated by the agencies 
responsible. 
 
Somalia has meanwhile been plagued with uncertain rainfall for most of the last decade: a 
flood emergency in late 1997 – affecting up to one million people and causing the 
destruction of irrigation canals and river embankments, losses of pumps and of livestock 
and crops (including many banana plantations which were important sources of seasonal 
work) – was followed by a prolonged period of poor rains. As drought conditions in 
southern Somalia have intensified, food insecurity has been compounded by the 
continuing civil strife. Grazing lands and water supplies of pastoralists in south-eastern 
Ethiopia, north-eastern Kenya and Dijbouti have also been affected. The most recent 
assessment by Oxfam International (February 2006) is that hundreds of thousands of 
people are now at immediate risk of water shortage in southern Somalia, with some 
pastoralist families existing on only one twentieth of the recommended minimum daily 
water supply; the UN estimates that some 1.7 million Somalis are currently affected by 
the worst drought of the decade. 
 
Sources:  
FAO Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture/WFP: 
FAO/WFP Special Report: Unfavourable Outlook for the Current Season Could 
Aggravate Already Precarious Food Situation in Somalia, July 3 1998  
http://www.fao.org//docrep/004/w9098e/w9098e00.htm
FAS Online: Somalia: Severe Drought Reduces Grain Production and Increases Food 
Shortages, January 14 2002   
http://www.fas.usda.gov/pecad2/highlights/2002/01/somalia/som_corn_02.htm
Nathalie Gomes: Access to water, pastoral resource management and pastoralists’ 
livelihoods: Lessons learned from water development in selected areas of Eastern 
Africa (Kenya, Ethiopia and Somalia), internal draft paper, FAO Livelihood 
Support Programme, Nairobi: FAO and IFRA-Nairobi, 2005 
Oxfam International: Oxfam assessment: deaths from dehydration as Somalis exist on a 
twentieth of minimum water ration, Oxfam press release, February 16 2006   
http://www.oxfam.org/uk/press/releases/somalia_160206.htm
Michele Nori: EC Marie-Curie-funded Milking Drylands research initiative, 2006  
Michael Roth: ‘Somalia Land Policies and Tenure Impacts: The Case of the Lower 
Shebelle’, in Thomas Bassett and Donald Crummey (eds.), Land in African 
Agrarian Systems, USA: University of Wisconsin Press, 1993 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs-OCHA-Online: 
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Appendix 6: The Tuareg People of Southern Niger
1
 
The traditional cultivation and dry season grazing area (home base) of the Iullemeden Kel 
Dinnik Tuareg in southern Niger is relatively well watered, but rainy season migration 
historically took place in order to access minerals 250 km to the northeast, and to allow 
for dry season grazing recovery. Except in the case of larger and richer families, demands 
for labour for crop cultivation meant that it was usually only young men who migrated, 
leaving other family members to look after the fields. The main constraint on production 
was thus neither pasture nor drinking water but rather shortage of labour for herding and 
cultivation, as well as the complex forces in Tuareg social structure which limited the 
rights of subordinate classes to accumulate livestock and allowed Tuareg 'warlords' to 
control access to the rangelands.  
 
These semi-nomadic Tuaregs’ situation began to deteriorate from the early 1950s, when 
demographic pressure pushed both cultivating Hausa and nomadic pastoral Fulani 
northwards into their home base, albeit that this was checked temporarily by the drought 
of 1968-73; Tuareg livestock numbers themselves fell severely during the drought and 
local surface water sources deteriorated. From 1960 the then French administration also 
introduced government-operated and owned boreholes and concrete-lined open wells, 
which encouraged sedentarization, out-migration and crop expansion; the boreholes 
provided free access to water (and so to grazing), allowing an enormous influx of 
livestock, largely but not solely belonging to the Fulani, into an area where Tuareg 
ascendancy and private ownership of wells (although not of the pastures surrounding 
them) had traditionally restricted livestock numbers (and Fulani pastoralists). The result 
of all this was decreasing control of the rangelands, and disadvantage to the local Tuareg, 
for whom access to water and grazing has thus worsened despite the introduction of the 
additional water points. By the early 1970s the Tuareg were in some cases requesting the 




By the early 1980s, crop production among the Tuareg had increased because of livestock 
losses during drought making them more dependent on agriculture, and also because 
farming helped to maintain land rights in the face of the demographic pressures; the 
Tuareg had also ceased their rainy season migration in search of mineralised water and 
pasture and started importing salt instead. Political changes thus led to the collapse of the 
                                                 
1 This appendix draws extensively on Stephen Sandford’s ILCA Research Report No.8: Organisation and 
Management of Water Supplies in Tropical Africa (1983), who draws principally on Bernus’ Touareg 
nigériens: unité culturelle et diersité régionale d’un people Pasteur  (1981) and Eddy’s Labor and land use 
on mixed farms in the pastoral zone of Niger (1979). It also draws on Maryam Niamir-Fuller’s CF Note 4: 
Community Forestry: Herders’ Decision-Making in Natural Resources Management in Arid and Semi-arid 
Africa (1990), who draws on Bernus’ Possibilites et limites de la politique hydraulique pastorale dans le 
sahel nigérien (1974). 
 
2 The neighbouring Illabakan Tuareg eventually forced the Niger Government to close down some 
boreholes so that they could regain their control over the land when the outsiders left the area (Niamir-
Fuller 1990). 
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former system of coping with grazing and water shortages – through both the French 
suppression of the Tuareg social system, and the pattern of control of access to grazing 
and water which derived from it, and the opening of new government-operated water 
supplies. Not only has nothing arisen to take its place, but the Tuareg themselves have 
since become a persecuted minority in conflict with the government.  
 
Conflict was particularly intense during the early 1990s between the Tuaregs of northern 
Niger and Mali and their respective governments (there had been anti-French uprisings as 
early as 1963). A peace agreement was signed in 1995 in Niger but was reneged on 
shortly thereafter and has been poorly implemented since; after a military coup in January 
1996 Tuareg refugees from the north began moving to urban areas in response to famine 
amid concerns that government-distributed famine relief was being used to squeeze the 
nomads further. Most recently, some 2.5 million people in southern Niger faced starvation 
in 2005 due to a combination of poor rains and locust plagues in 2004. From their former 
ascendancy, the Nigerien Tuareg have thus descended through the twentieth century to 
being an endangered people today. 
 
Sources:  
Associated Press: Millions in Niger face starvation, August 2 2005 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8800128/from/RL.3/  
Maryam Niamir-Fuller: CF Note 4: Community Forestry: Herders’ Decision-Making in 
Natural Resources Management in Arid and Semi-arid Africa, Rome: FAO, 1990  
http://www.fao.org//docrep/t6260e/t6260e00.htm
Eric Pape: ‘The ‘Hunger Season’: Some weakened kids are ‘letting themselves die’’, in 
Newsweek, August 15 2005  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8852855/site/newsweek/  
Stephen Sandford: ILCA Research Report No.8: Organisation and Management of Water 
Supplies in Tropical Africa, Addis Ababa: ILCA, 1983  
http://www.ilri.cgiar.org/InfoServ/Webpub/Fulldocs/IntegratedWater/IWMI/Docu
ments/related_doucments/HTML/x5526e/x5526e00.htm
Survie Touragègue-TEMOUST: Tuaregs, A Threatened People, 1999 
http://www.cwis.org/fwdp/Africa/tuareg.txt
Survie Touragègue-TEMOUST: Press Release May 7, 1990 – May 7, 2000. The 
massacres at Tchin Tabaraden: 10 years later! No justice for the civilian Tuareg 
men, women and children massacred at Tchin Tabaraden, 2000   
http://membres.lycos.fr/temoust/press_release7500.htm  
The Tazzla Institute for Cultural Diversity: Press Release 23 April 2002  
http://www.dialoguebetweennations.com/N2N/PFII/English/HeleneHagan.htm
USAID: Niger – Food Insecurity, Situation Report #2, Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, August 2 
2005  
http://ftp.info.usaid.gov/our_work/humanitarian_assistance/disaster_assistance/co
untries/Niger/dr_index.html )  
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Appendix 7: Conflict over Land and Water in Darfur 
 
The current conflict in Darfur is a prime example of what can happen when land use 
conflicts between neighbouring communities are allowed to fester. Although it is by now 
more complex, Darfur’s present problems are nonetheless rooted in an inter-tribal dispute 
over land and water rights between sedentary cultivators and pastoralists. For some sixty 
years after the 1917 demise of the secessionist Fur Sultan, Ali Dinar, the nomadic and 
sedentary people of Darfur had lived in relative harmony thanks to a system of local 
government, albeit imposed by the Condominium of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which 
was sensitive to local ecology and land use. However, by the 1970s it was apparent that 
action had to be taken to resolve potential land use conflicts between cultivators and 
pastoralists as migratory trails were being increasingly blocked by cultivation. There were 
inevitable skirmishes as the nomads moved southwards to their dry season wells along 
their traditional routes which were flanked by fields of unharvested sorghum and bulrush 
millet, but the hierarchy of traditional leaders - sheikhs, omdas and nazirs - normally 
succeeded in mediating these.  
 
In the 1970s, just as the oil crisis was beginning to bite, the positions of sheikhs and 
nazirs were formally abolished and ‘people’s councils’ were set up instead. However, the 
national government failed to deliver the necessary funds and, by the early 1980s, local 
government in Darfur was bankrupt. A series of local conflicts erupted in the wake of the 
1984-85 drought and famine, in which pastoral groups were pitted against farmers in what 
had become a bitter struggle for diminishing resources. Government intervention was 
ineffective, so people armed themselves to protect their herds, flocks and crops. 
Competition over land increased further in 1994, immediately exacerbating the conflict, 
when the government reintroduced the colonial system of administration, allocating 
territories to chiefs who were given the authority to allocate land therein.   
 
The critical difference between the period since the 1980s and that prior, is that the 
mechanisms for dealing with tribal disputes - namely the tribal administration and the 
police and the judiciary - have been neglected. In addition the Sudanese government has 
looked upon the issue as residual: something to be dealt with only when it forces itself 
onto the political agenda as a result of major clashes. As in neighbouring countries, 
national politicians have also exploited local disputes over land and natural resources for 
their own political advantage. Any solution must now involve negotiation with all the 
protagonists, to persuade them to lay down their arms, and the re-instatement of a police 
force and system of local government in which local people have confidence and which 
must therefore include efforts to build on the former customary procedures for land and 




Alex de Waal: ‘Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap: The Road to Darfur’, London Review 
of Books, 5 August 2004  http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n15/waal01_.html
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Independent Land Newsletter: Struggling with Land Reform Issues in Eastern Africa 
Today, edited by Nelson Marongwe and Robin Palmer, Land Rights in Africa, 
Oxfam (based on information supplied by Martin Adams and reproduced here 
with permission from Oxfam), August 2004 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/what_we_do/issues/livelihoods/landrights/downloads/in
d_land_newsletter_eastern_africa_aug_2004.rtf
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Appendix 8: Land and Water Rights for Agro-pastoralists in Botswana 
 
Agro-pastoralism based on communal land use and tenure is the predominant production 
system in Botswana, which supports large numbers of people in the rural areas for whom 
there are no viable economic alternatives. It makes effective use of a variable 
environment by mitigating the negative aspects of unreliable rainfall as well as exploiting 
low land costs. As a result, Botswana is one of the world’s lowest cost producers of beef. 
 
Concern has been expressed in Botswana for over 40 years at what is perceived in certain 
quarters to be the over utilization of pasture resources in the communal grazing areas 
leading to land ‘degradation’. There is, however, disagreement about what constitutes 
land degradation, and there is a growing body of scientific evidence to suggest that a wide 
variety of stocking rates are sustainable in savanna rangelands. Government has addressed 
the issue through a policy of privatising rangelands through the development of private 
boreholes, initially under the Tribal Grazing Lands Policy (TGLP), which was introduced 
in 1975. Since 1991, under the Fencing Component of the New Agricultural Policy more 
communal land is being leased to commercial ranchers.  
 
The available evidence suggests that the privatisation of grazing and water supplies has 
neither resulted in more productive investments nor superior land management, with most 
ranches being managed in the same way as unfenced communal land. Moreover, 
privatisation of rangeland has high social costs. People were displaced under the TGLP 
and are again being displaced under the Fencing Component. Government has spent large 
sums of money accommodating displaced people. Rural dispossession, with increasing 
numbers of people owning no livestock, abandoning arable agriculture and holding no 
land, is fuelling accelerating rural to urban migration.  
 
The TGLP provided large farmers with a chance to acquire exclusive grazing and water 
rights and increase their income, but it has thus worsened the lot of the poor. It did not 
relieve pressure on grazing in communal areas, instead providing only a temporary 
stopgap whilst cattle herds were still building up in ranches during years with good 
rainfall; when drought came, overstocking in farms spilled back on to the communal land. 
There was a view that fencing induced a realisation of the finite nature of grazing 
resources and hence of the necessity to adjust stock numbers according to the availability 
of forage reserves. On the contrary, however, occupation of fenced ranches in Botswana 
has often encouraged stocking rates far higher than those normal for communal areas; 
when this caused the rapid depletion of grazing on the ranch, the owners simply drove 
their cattle back onto the communal range. The protests of small farmers in the communal 
areas, and occasionally of officials, made no impression on this practice. 
  
It is now acknowledged that the great majority of the TGLP ranches have been used as 
extensions of the communal area - thus as no more than enclosed cattle posts. The 
assumption that cattle posts in the communal areas could be converted into commercial 
farms by simply fencing them has not been shown to be correct: their owners’ 
management decisions continued to be driven by the same socio-cultural and economic 
parameters irrespective of whether their land was fenced or communal. The policy was 
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directed towards serving the interests of a small minority of large-scale farmers but 
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Appendix 9: Tanzanian Water Rights 
 
Land and water rights in Tanzania are vested in the State.  Apart from minor uses, all 
rights to ‘divert, dam, store and use water’ are in principle subject to a permit issued by 
the appointed Water Officer. A permit may ‘be made appurtenant to land’ as is normally 
the case for irrigation. The Water Officer has wide powers in deciding permit terms and, 
in effect, has always made some allowance for accustomed rights and environmental 
needs. Water rights formalised under the colonial 1959 Water Ordinance and accepted by 
the 1974 Water Utilisation (Control & Regulation) Act include those ‘derived from native 
law and customs’. In practice, however, much of the system is moribund and 
informal/customary use lies generally outside the system. Informal/customary (and 
usually small-scale) users have seldom been willing to apply under the Act, not just 
because of the fees incurred but also because in a basic sense they do not recognise the 
legitimacy of the official system.   
 
Following modern integrated water resources management (IWRM) precepts, River Basin 
Offices were activated during the 1990s with World Bank support in the two most 
contentious basins – the Pangani and Rufiji – and, on the initiative of the Basin Officers, 
registration has been extended to much private and communal irrigation. But it has been 
almost impossible to collect fees or to enforce the terms of water permits on numerous 
small-scale users, given objections from the rights holders, constraints and abuses in 
monitoring and enforcement, and great variability of dry season flows (there is normally 
more than enough in the wet season).  This is true not just of longstanding but also of 
recent private and communal uses, given that irrigation is largely a fairly recent 
phenomenon (in the upper Rufiji basin [Usangu] for instance up to 90% of the irrigated 
area has been developed since the 1959 ordinance).  The Basin Offices can fulfil real 
functions (e.g. in data collection, planning and conflict resolution) but permit 
administration for small-scale users may be beyond their institutional and financial 
capacity, besides tending to favour larger users and those applying under the formal 
system.  The 2002 Water Policy upholds the permit system but goes on to state that 
‘relevant customary law and practice … will be institutionalised into statutes’ (Section 
4.11). It is unclear what this means. A revised water law has been drafted but problems in 
aligning formal and informal/customary means of access to the resource, and in defining 
informal/customary users under dynamic present day conditions, remain an important 
factor delaying its finalisation.  
 
Sources: 
Ilja Betlem: Preliminary Report on National Water Resources Laws and Institutions in 
Tanzania, FAO Water Law and Advisory Programme - GCP/INT/620/NET, 1997 
FAO Water Law and Policy Advisory Programme: Draft Water Resources Act, Comments 
and Suggestions, GCP/INT/620/NET, 1997 
Hunting Technical Services: Sustainable Management of the Usangu Wetland and its 
Catchment, March 2001 
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United Republic of Tanzania: National Water Policy, Ministry of Water and Livestock 
Development, July 2002 
Barbara Van Koppen, Charles S. Sokile, Bruce A. Lankford, Nuhu Hatibu, Henry Mahoo 
and Pius Z. Yanda:  Water Rights and Water Fees in Rural Tanzania, draft chapter 
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Appendix 10: Water Rights in Zimbabwe’s Communal Areas 
 
Zimbabwe’s waters were divided into the categories of commercial and primary use at the 
start of the twentieth century, reflecting the division between commercial (alienated) and 
communal (customary) land areas and, correspondingly, between European-based formal 
law and local customary law. Commercial agriculture and the urban/industrial/mining 
sector account for roughly 75 percent and 20 percent of all water consumption in 
Zimbabwe; the communal land areas account for only 5 percent. Water in the communal 
areas is generally underdeveloped due to lack of (formal) water rights/permits, low use of 
commercial water and irrigation, and the lack of water storage capacity for commercial 
activities.  
 
The Water Act of 1998 (and accompanying Zimbabwe National Water Authority Act) 
continued this division and adopted the ‘user pays’ principle for water for commercial use 
alongside free access to ‘primary water’ – water used for domestic purposes in the 
communal areas. In these latter areas informal local water rights and practices of water 
allocation persist, incorporating customary notions that no-one should be denied access to 
water - because it is inextricably linked to the right to a livelihood.  
 
The Water Act vested water solely in the state and required permits to be obtained for all 
commercial usage. At the same time a main concern of current policy is to promote the 
use of commercial water in the communal land areas; increasing efforts to develop 
agriculture and enterprise are increasing demands for water (particularly for horticultural 
investments, including women’s vegetable gardens, and mining (gold-panning and rock-
excavation)) and leading to greater formalisation of water use rights. One problem, 
however, is that access to permits for water for commercial agricultural use is tied to 
having title deeds for land, which most people in the communal areas do not have, and 
thus in practice access to water for such purposes still relies heavily on customary land 
and water use rights.  
 
One recent study of three villages in Mhondoro Communal Land suggests that although 
recent investments in water might be expected to make the resource an increasingly 
‘enclosed’ one, in fact local norms about free access were sufficiently strong that most 
‘private’ wells and boreholes on individual homesteads were in effect ‘public’; water was 
showing no signs yet of commodifying in the same way as land. For example, a borehole 
constructed in one village by the Zimbabwe Tobacco Association primarily for tobacco 
growers had become a common source of drinking water for the whole village; people 
who could easily obtain land close to a dam for income-generating horticultural activities 
were also reluctant to pay for water when it was moved to their gardens by pump, even 
though a technological distinction has now been made between commercial and primary 
water usage, with water moved by hand as primary (and hence free) and water moved by 
machine as commercial (and hence chargeable). Questions have also begun to be asked 
about applying the user pays principle to borehole users as their maintenance and repair 
has now become the responsibility of the users, but enforcing this is also likely to be 
problematic. 
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New institutions of water management in Zimbabwe may thus be intended to make it 
easier for both small-scale users and large-scale commercial farmers to access local water 
resources, but they run in parallel to existing and evolving local practices of sharing water 
freely which link rights to water and land.  
 
Sources: 
Bill Derman and Anne Hellum: ‘Neither Tragedy Nor Enclosure: Are There Inherent  
Human Rights in Water Management in Zimbabwe’s Communal Lands?’, in Tor 
A. Benjaminson and Christian Lund (eds.), Securing Land Rights in Africa, 
London: Frank Cass, 2003 
Synne Movik, Lyla Mehta, Sobona Mtisi and Alan Nicol: ‘A “Blue Revolution” for 
African Agriculture?’, IDS Bulletin, 36, 2, 41-45, June 2005 
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Appendix 11: Who Controls the Water for Domestic and Livestock Use in Sudan?
h
 
A hafir is a reservoir (6000-12,000 cubic metres) fed from rainwater and run-off. In 
Sudan, these were first constructed by the colonial government using heavy earth-moving 
excavation equipment, especially in the clay plains of central Sudan where adequate 
supplies of groundwater were unavailable and hence rainwater and run-off were more 
valuable resources for economic development. The policy was to provide water in 
accordance with development requirements, to enable settlement for cultivation, and to 
extend the availability of pasture during the dry season. By independence in 1956, over 
500 hafirs had been constructed; on average each one supplied about 1000-2000 people 
and their livestock during the long dry season (November to June). The programme 
continued, but by the mid 1970s funds for essential maintenance were scarce and large 
numbers of hafirs in Kordofan and Darfur provinces silted up and fell out of use; the 
Rural Water Corporation Annual Report for 1981/82 for Kordofan Region identified 
inadequate funds and poor condition of vehicles and heavy plant as major problems.  
 
During the 1990s, the international NGO SOS Sahel became involved in the construction 
of hafirs in North Kordofan, with NGO staff and local community members building 10 
new  hafirs. The communities provided labour and resources and formed local 
management committees in order to own and manage the reservoirs once construction 
was complete. Formal ownership and control was handed over by SOS Sahel to the 
committees in 1998, which thenceforth charged SD5.00 (US$0.02) per 10 litre tin of 
water. 
 
In 2004 the Water Corporation of North Kordofan State passed a new law saying that the 
management of hafirs would in future come under their jurisdiction, regardless of any 
arrangements made when they had been constructed. The Water Corporation also decided 
to start taxing the use of hafir water. Following a ban in 2003 on taxing agricultural 
products, tax on water has now become a major source of revenue for the State.  
 
In Warshal village, the Water Corporation then asked the community to pay SD100,000 
(approximately US$400.00) in arrears for their past drawing of water from the hafir. A 
Water Corporation Officer, accompanied by a policeman, also began to visit the village 
to collect levies on daily water sales. However, the community management committee 
refused to pay these taxes on the grounds that ownership of the hafir lay with the 
community and not with government, whereupon four members of the community were 
taken to the provincial capital and asked to pay SD1,300,000 (approximately US$5,000). 
They refused and were put in jail. The case then went to court, which ruled in favour of 
the community: their claim of ownership over the hafir was upheld and the four men 
were released. The Water Corporation has subsequently accepted the communities’ 
management rights and agreed to share income from the hafir on an equal basis, allowing 
SOS Sahel to bring together representatives from the Water Corporation, other 
                                                 
h This account is principally based upon an article by Mohammed Abdel Mahmoud and Faisal Hasab el 
Rasoul which appeared in Haramata Bulletin of the Drylands: People, Policies and Programmes, IIED 
(London), 2005, and is reproduced here with permission of Dr Camilla Toulmin (Director of IIED).  
    
 
government branches, civil society organisations and the judiciary to discuss the problem 
and draw up recommendations to be submitted to the Legal Reform Committee, the most 
important of which can be summarised as follows: 
 
•  Reinstate the clauses in the Water Law, 1998 which relate to community compensation 
for contributions to the development of water resources owned by the Water Corporation. 
•  When, after negotiation and agreement, the Water Corporation takes over ownership of a 
water resource it must commit to maintenance of the resource. 
•  The rôle of beneficiary communities should not be forgotten. The government should 
recognize local institutions. This should be supported with new legislation that defines the 
rôles, responsibilities, relationships and co-management systems for these institutions. 
•  The Water Corporation should take into account the history of water sources established 
by other institutions. This requires new clauses in laws for appropriate management. 
•  Creation of links between the Water Corporation and civil society organisations to agree 
rôles/responsibilities where there exists community ownership of rural assets. This requires 
capacity building and coordination in planning and implementation. 
 
Sources: 
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